Probing that question is my ultimate aim in this article, but we will get there somewhat indirectly. I will first make an affirmative argument for cognitive enhancement through drugs or other neuroscientific interventions. Then I will talk about concerns, both appropriate and inappropriate, about these kinds of enhancements. Only then will I try to understand the strong negative reactions to our paper and what we might learn from them.
Note first, though, that this is largely a hypothetical discussion, as cognitive enhancement remains largely in the future. Current, direct brain interventions for the purposes of cognitive enhancement are few and far between, comprising mainly a few stimulant drugs of unclear (but clearly not enormous) effectiveness and uncertain risks. Yet the explosion of our knowledge of the human brain-and the scores of billions of dollars being invested in discovering treatments for brain-based ailments, some of which are likely to spin off enhancement products-convince me that these issues will be substantial, perhaps in this decade and likely in the next.
Why Cognitive Enhancement-and What Kinds of Enhancements?
We want to enhance our brain for the same reason we want to enhance anything else: to make it work better. At the risk of tautology, enhancing something means making it better. Many people find direct brain enhancement frightening. There are some good reasons for concern, though not, I think, for fear; other worries about these technologies are unsubstantiated.
The three issues I worry about are safety, fairness, and coercion.
We have at least some vague idea of the risks of existing enhancement technologies, not from large, systematic studies, which don't exist, but because we have seen them in widespread use. Furthermore, tool enhancements seem less likely than direct enhancements to have dangerous effects on the brain. An enhancement that works through the visual system, for example, is unlikely to pose substantial new kinds of safety risks (although there may be exceptions, such as flashing patterns that might trigger epileptic seizures). Given the awesome complexity of the human brain and our still very limited understanding of it, we should be worried about the effects of new drugs or new methods of brain stimulation or surgery designed to enhance the brain.
The way such enhancements are likely to be regulated should magnify our concern. I expect most of these enhancing technologies to be developed not for the purpose of enhancement but as treatments for illness or deterioration. In the United States, drugs, biological products, and most high-risk medical devices can be sold only after the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Cerebrum, July 2010 4 has been convinced that they are both safe and effective. The FDA, however, makes that decision in the context of one particular proposed use. This makes perfect sense-a drug that instantly cures half of the people treated and quickly but painlessly kills the other half would be seen as acceptably safe and effective as a treatment for metastatic pancreatic cancer, but not for treating acne.
Once the FDA approves a new drug, biologic, or medical device, a physician may legally prescribe it for any use, even though that use may never have been proven safe or effective. This approach to -off-label use‖ will mean that, at least as far as the FDA is concerned, approved drugs, biologics, and devices can be used for enhancement purposes where neither the safety nor the efficacy is known and where the balance of benefit and risk may be quite different.
(Professional standards and potential malpractice liability do provide some constraints.)
Even worse, some non-drug methods of cognitive enhancement will receive no FDA review. The FDA has no jurisdiction over new surgical techniques using approved drugs and devices; no one has to prove in advance that these techniques are safe and effective. Medical devices that the FDA does not consider high-risk, or that are -substantially similar‖ to existing devices, get only minimal review. Dietary supplements are almost completely unreviewed when they are purported only to affect the -structure or function‖ of the body-as would be the case with cognitive enhancements-and not to treat disease.
Off-label use is already a problem. Amphetamine and dextroamphetamine (Adderall) and methylphenidate (Ritalin) are drugs prescribed to millions of Americans to treat attention deficit disorder (ADD) or attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). They are also widely used on college and high school campuses as -study drugs‖ to help students without an ADD or ADHD diagnosis fight off sleep and focus better on their work. A survey in 2008 showed that four percent of 1,800 randomly surveyed students at a large public university had prescriptions for Adderall or Ritalin; another 34 percent of the students (including more than half of the juniors and seniors) had used the drugs without a prescription, almost all of whom said they took it to help them study. 3 Yet we have few, if any, good studies of the safety and efficacy of these drugs when students use them without a prescription to try to improve their educations (or at least their grades).
Future cognitive enhancements will only make this problem worse. Like any interventions, they will have varying risks and benefits, yet our current regulatory scheme would require no testing for some kinds and very little testing for others. Even for drugs, the most What can we handle this problem? We could put our hopes in malpractice liability to limit prescriptions (though that will not prevent patients from reselling the drugs or giving them to their friends). We could try, with scant chances of success, to ban the use of all cognitive enhancements because of safety concerns. Or we could require better research on, and better regulation of, cognitive enhancements.
Fairness concerns also demand attention. New, effective cognitive enhancements could add to existing questions. Is it fair for one student to take an exam after studying all night using
Adderall when another student has not taken the drug? Is it fair for one student to take the exam after nighttime studying fueled by double espressos or energy drinks? Is it fair for one student to take the test after receiving tutoring that another could not afford, or after using a computer or a computer program that the other did not have?
There is a broader question of fairness here. If direct cognitive enhancements really work, and if they are expensive, presumably only the rich will have access to them. This is the new face of an old concern. The single greatest current cognitive enhancing technology is primary education, particularly literacy and arithmetic. Not long ago, even in rich countries, primary education was generally unavailable to the children of the poor. Now almost every country makes free primary (and usually secondary, and sometimes tertiary) education available.
Cognitive enhancements need not lead to unfairness. If limited access to effective cognitive enhancement is a problem, we probably could manage it much better by making enhancements available to everyone than by trying, probably unsuccessfully, to prohibit them to anyone. If we felt that this remained unfair to those who chose not to use enhancements, teachers could institute different grading curves for -enhanced‖ and -unenhanced‖ students. And note that if students do learn better using direct brain enhancements with low risk, both they and the world are presumably better off because they are better educated.
Finally, we must consider coercion. Should we allow people to be forced to undergo direct cognitive enhancement? The example of free education suggests one answer: Sometimes we should. Countries make primary education not only universally accessible but universally compulsory. Some enhancements might be so safe and so powerful that, like reading, writing, and arithmetic, they should be required.
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6 Short of that, though, should we put limitations on coercion? Employers often force employees to attend workshops or take courses to improve the employees' performance, without any real evidence that such interventions are either safe or effective. Should an employer be allowed to say, -Take these memory-improving pills or you will be fired‖? Should the military be able to say, -Take these alertness-improving pills or you will be court-martialed‖?
Most difficult, should parents be able to coerce their children to use direct brain enhancements? We give parents very broad scope in decisions about raising their children;
Supreme Court has ruled that the Constitution protects parents' rights to make some such
decisions. Yet that discretion is not endless; at some point, child protective services can be called and parental discretion overruled. Where should we draw the line with parents seeking to improve their children's brains?
These questions about coercion, like those regarding safety and fairness, do not lend themselves to definitive answers. Good answers will doubtless depend on the enhancement technology and on the social circumstances. But we need to begin to come up with answers, and soon.
What Shouldn't We Worry About?
There are at least three unsound reasons for concern: cheating, solidarity, and naturalness.
Many people find the assertion that enhancement is cheating to be convincing. The idea of enhancement as cheating is also related to the idea that enhancement replaces
effort. Yet the plausible cognitive enhancements would not eliminate the need to study; they would just make studying more effective. In any event, we do not reward effort, we reward Cerebrum, July 2010 7 success. People with naturally good memories have advantages over others in organic chemistry exams, but they did not work for that good memory.
Some argue that enhancement is unnatural and threatens to take us beyond our humanity.
This argument, too, suffers from a major problem. All of our civilization is unnatural. A fair speaker could not fly across a continent, take a taxi to an air-conditioned auditorium, and give a microphone-assisted PowerPoint presentation decrying enhancement as unnatural without either a sense of humor or a good argument for why these enhancements are different. Because they change our physical bodies? So do medicine, good food, clothing, and a hundred other unnatural changes. Because they change our brains? So does education. What argument justifies drawing the line here and not there? A strong naturalness argument against direct brain enhancements, in particular, has not been-and I think cannot be-made. Humans have constantly been changing our world and ourselves, sometimes for better and sometimes for worse. A golden age of unenhanced naturalness is a myth, not an argument.
Why Do People Care So Much?
So why did I get all those odd e-mails? Why do people care so much about this? I do not have any good social-science data, but I want to suggest some ideas that seem plausible.
First, the cognitive enhancements we have today are stimulants. Some stimulants are drugs of abuse, illegally used to get high, and these can be very risky. Adderall is a combination of several kinds of amphetamines; other enhancing stimulants similarly provide alertness and attention. The currently available direct brain enhancements are not only weak and, when used off-label, of uncertain safety, but they are a socially stigmatized kind of product. I suspect that people will be more accepting when the cognitive enhancer is a drug that boosts memory, or a little electrical stimulator that sticks to the scalp.
Second, some people compare cognitive enhancement to steroids, human growth hormone, and -blood doping‖ in sports. Just as the latter are wrong, they urge, so is the former. It is not at all clear to me that enhancement in sports is wrong, except to the extent that it is against the rules of particular sports and breaking the rules is wrong. Top-level athletes are enhanced by training, conditioning, equipment, nutrition, coaching, and psychological counseling, among other things. The case for singling out performance-enhancing drugs as the bad enhancement in sports has the same problems as the case against cognitive enhancement. should not reject them for fear of where they may lead in a distant future. Future applications will be the problems, and the decisions, of our grandchildren and their grandchildren, who will have the benefit of more knowledge both of the technologies involved and of their culture's views of those technologies. For us to think that we can, today, make better choices for them based on almost no information about the questions they will face is hubris.
In Conclusion --It Depends‖
As in the Nature article, I have not argued here that direct brain enhancements are good, let alone that they should be added to the water supply. I have argued that they are not necessarily bad. Their appropriate use will depend on their safety and effectiveness, along with how we choose to use them and what steps we take to mitigate the challenges to fairness they may pose or the invasions of individual autonomy they may provoke.
Biomedicine will be creating more and more products and procedures that can be used for cognitive enhancement. Some of them will be used in ways that will, on balance, improve human life and society. At the same time, I worry that they may be used in harmful ways. I am confident, though, that a knee-jerk rejection of all direct brain enhancements will be at least a missed opportunity and at worst an opening for a damaging underground and uncontrolled world of enhancements. In order to maximize the benefits and minimize the harms of these new technologies, we will need to look at particular enhancements rationally and to adopt, ban, or regulate them carefully. On this, much depends. 
